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‘Who’s your Daddy?’
A question of sovereignty and the use of
psychoanalysis
Juliet Rogers1
It is not the surface but the depth, not the apparent but the hidden, not the
obvious but the arcane that prescribes the meanings and indeed the loves
of a law that is paradoxically without desire (Goodrich 1995: 32).
The love of the law is flighty. Indeed, it represents itself as ‘without
desire’. It is a love imagined emanating from a sovereign that does,
and has, and may again, exercise its whimsical decision and render the
subject, as Giorgio Agamben (1998) has described abandoned and as
Jacques Lacan has offered: castrated.2 Consequently this love is
experienced, on some level, as precarious. It is a love that can be
withdrawn, or directed to an-other, at any time. What evokes the law’s
desire is neither obvious nor apparent. It is hidden from the ordinary
subject.
In the condition of imagining its desirability to the law the subject
exists in a state of anxiety. Like the child Freud’s patients recalled,
who is imagining a beating experienced by someone, the subject knows
the father’s displeasure will arrive — someone will be beaten — thus
the subject splits the uncertainty about inhabiting the position of loved
child and imagines the disposal of the displeasure into an-other (Freud
2001a). The child of the father and the subject before the sovereign
occupy the same position. The decision, the beating, the abandonment
arrives, somewhere. The question for the psychoanalytic subject and
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the question for the subject of the liberal body politic is how to be
desirable enough to secure the sovereign’s pleasure.
The emergence of the anxiety of desirability in the psychoanalytic
subject and in the liberal (democratic) subject is no coincidence. It is
not a universal condition. It is a particular, politically contingent and
culturally invested terrain that both liberal and psychoanalytic
discourses speak to. And not accidentally. The anxious condition
betrayed in the attempt to inhabit the place where love, rather than
beating, or abandonment, may be received from the sovereign is both
a political and psychoanalytic concern because both are wrestling with
their desirability before a potentially abandoning or castrating Other;
the father, the sovereign, the Lacanian (big O) Other, from whom
decisions will be, or will be imagined to be, administered (Lacan 2006).3
Indeed I suggest in this article that the anxious condition of the liberal
subject is a parallel condition for the psychoanalytic subject.
Lacan has stated: ‘enlightenment man, is psychoanalytic man’.4 This
is not a happy accident, but has emerged because the subjects of the
liberal polity exist in a state of anxiety. This anxiety is a product of the
political condition heralded by the Enlightenment and embodied in the
fantasies of political certainties and curiosities that mark the ‘western’
polis since Rene Descartes announced the doubt of the cogito. And, it
is precisely this condition of doubt — a doubt fuelled by the presence
of a deciding sovereign — that psychoanalysis, sometimes
unconsciously, has theorised and indeed profited from.
The concern of this article is predominantly with the use of
psychoanalysis as a method to address the modes of performance, and
indeed production of a liberal subjectivity. In one sense I am justifying
this use, but also attempting to explain why psychoanalysis cannot —
or least should not, until further thinking is done5 — be used as a tool
to analyse a universal psyche or the psyche of all. The ways in which I
discuss this problematic are through explaining how the orientation of
the liberal subject, imagining itself free, betrays a particular relation
to the whimsical sovereign, who can — or is imagined to be able to —
decide exceptionally at any time. This orientation is mirrored in
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psychoanalysis as a relation to what Lacan has come to call the Other.
This figure is not law, it is the fantasised sovereign that comes to being
in his/her decisions, and sometimes office. This figure plagues the liberal
subject’s desire and thus its capacity to perform as desirable, or, in the
terms of the democratic body politic, as free.
In the first section of this article I will discuss the dual emergence
of psychoanalysis and a liberal politics in dialogue with the democratic
state. This is specifically evident in the convergence of a discourse of
free contract in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1968) and the
problematics of free choice that the killing of Sigmund Freud’s primal
father inaugurates (2001b). These are not liberal discourses, of course,
but they are, I argue, the staging of the event of a liberal subjectivity
that presupposes freedom as an outcome to political participation in
Rousseau’s contractual configuration, and action in Freud’s scenario.
In the second section I consider the parallel concerns of liberal and
psychoanalytic discourse in respect to the possibility of enacting desire
as freedom. This is particularly pertinent when the political and social
conditions produce that very desire.
In the terms of Jacques Lacan the relation between desire and
freedom is a question of ‘imaginary servitude’ that only psychoanalysis
can illuminate, and only love can untie (Lacan 2006: 80). I argue that
the psychoanalytic speech on this servitude is the consolidation of a
liberal discourse of rights and free speech. In the third section I explore
the problematic of a search for the sovereign who can offer the fantasy
of a free choice qua freedom to contract, and the anxiety that this search
betrays. I will conclude with a departure from theories of Christian
onto-political performance by the liberal subject through considering
the importance of regarding the contemporary subjectivity of such a
subject as particalised, that is, as offering an economic piece in the
contract, rather than performing as a whole subject who can or cannot
perform autonomy, or who is, or is not homo sacer.6 As an act of
particalisation I discuss a socio-political event of popular dissent in
Australia and how the language of this dissent attempts, what I call an
authorised capture of what is lost to the sovereign; a method of
disavowal of what is always already lost in subjection, a method of
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authorising the piece imagined given to the sovereign. In this scenario
the particle is speech, and its performance as ‘free speech’ is the fantasy
of securing freedom before the castrating, abandoning and sometimes
very unloving sovereign.
Psychoanalytic history
The western subject is a subject that has long been produced through
the discourses of psychoanalysis, and a political discourse that mirrors
psychoanalytic concerns. This is a psychoanalysis that has precisely
responded to — been afforded by — the psychotic, neurotic and
perverse7 of Europe, and later the Americas and beyond (Derrida 1998:
65-90). That is, the founding and developing premises of psychoanalysis
speak of, and to, a European and English speaking world; a world that
has, for the past four centuries, been grappling with the Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment can be argued, in part, to articulate the possibility
and promise of acquiring sovereignty in relation to both the political
sovereign and the other for whom the Enlightenment also promised
equality and later, rights. Enlightenment can then be understood as a
promise of freedom as a lack of inhibiting, or prohibiting, performance
of the desires by another. For Lacan this would be to be free of the very
structure of desire, and for Immanuel Kant it is free to make use of
one’s reason. As Kant offered as the ingredients of enlightenment:
For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom
in question is the most innocuous form of all — freedom to make public
use of one’s reason in all matters (1991: 55).
The questions for psychoanalysis are: how does one have reason to
make public use of? Can freedom exist as a choice ‘to make use’ prior
to ‘the public’? And from where does this freedom come, if not from
the public? The answers to these questions articulate the limit inherent
in the freedom exercised as Kantian Reason. Psychoanalysis is
particularly concerned with this limit as a tool of subjection manifested
as law, language and the reason of the other qua public. The production
of reason qua Reason through ‘the public’, or, of law in relation to the
subject, is precisely what Lacan describes as ‘imaginary servitude’.
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Historically, the relation of reason to the subject’s servitude or
freedom before, in both a temporal and interpellatory sense, the
subjectifying parameters of law — or before the public — are the
questions of the Enlightenment in Europe. Since Descartes postulated
the existence of the cogito in the location of ‘thinking’ — that is, that
man derives his existence from a process derived externally, outside,
in the public — man has doubted his internal freedom, what Rousseau
describes as his ‘natural liberty’ (Rousseau 1968: 65), or what has
commonly been understood as an essence existing prior to subjection
to the law, language or any other form of, what has come to be called,
conditioning.8 However, this thing called ‘thinking’, particularly for
Lacan, was a process of utilising language; a language borrowed from
a prior Other; a language that exists temporally before the subject.
Language, as the tool for thinking, is something one is born in to, and
therefore does not choose, freely or otherwise.
Since the instance of the Cartesian cogito in, what we might call
‘western history’, the questions of the influence upon man of what he
was born into, as opposed to born with — genetically, naturally,
biologically, or spiritually — has been articulated in debates of the
internal/external or what has been called ‘nature/culture’. The influence
of these debates reflects what has emerged in psychoanalysis, and are
certainly the preoccupation of its theories. As Lacan forthrightly offers:
At this intersection of nature and culture, so obstinately scrutinized by the
anthropology of our times, psychoanalysis alone recognizes the knot of
imaginary servitude (2006: 80).
Psychoanalysis recognises, and attempts to think through, the
question of the symptoms of the subject as subjected to a prior ‘outside’,
if you like, or as subjected to the language of the Other; a language
which is not, and can never be one’s own. One of these symptoms is a
narcissistic identification with the rhetoric of the law as Goodrich (1994:
110) poses as the affect of every subject. This identification enables
what might be considered an almost romantic relation with the language
of the Other, as if the language is (narcissistically) reflecting one’s
own image, or one’s own desire. The conditions for performing one’s
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own desire are precisely what are at stake in recognising the knot of
imaginary servitude that I’ll take up later in relation to freedom and
Kantian Reason.
The question of imaginary servitude exemplifies the problematics
of a liberal premise, and a liberal sovereign promise, of autonomy for
a subject of contemporary western democracy, as a promise of being
free to enact one’s own desires beyond the realms of an imaginary
prohibition. This is a subject who, in Judith Butler’s terms need acquire
an ambivalence about the oppression and suppression that subject it to
the law of the sovereign demand (Butler 1997: 4-8). In Costas Douzinas’
discussion, this is the necessary straddling between the condition of
subjectus and subjectum (Douzinas 2000: 203-4) before a domestic
sovereign who promises freedom for all or an international sovereign
who wants to deliver free speech and maintain the inheritance of being
‘born free and equal’ (United Nations 1948). In the liberal polis or
neo-liberal world these promises are articulated as the protection of
human rights and/as a freedom from harm.
The harms of freedom
John Stuart Mill offered the simple formula of being free from harm
and thereby free to exercise one’s will before the limit of harming an-
other. This limit, for Mill (1974), would be secured by the state. The
conundrum of liberalism in the West, in its politics of freedom for the
individual and its necessary subjection of that individual to the
prohibition of its freedom through the laws of the body politic, is a
paradox which is essentially (and all too quickly) resolved through the
notion of free contract and the premise that one’s ‘natural liberty’ is to
enable free choice to participate in that contract. This resolution can be
summarised in the question for Rousseau in his treatise on The Social
Contract in 1762.
In Rousseau’s discussion he offers the condition of ‘the person’ in
his relation to freedom, others and the state, and the name ‘contract’
for his conditional existence. He asks:
157
Who’s your Daddy?
How to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods
of each member with the collective force of all, and under which each
individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself,
and remains as free as before?
And he resolves:
This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract holds the
solution (1986: 60).
Rousseau’s meditations on the ‘social contract’ as a kind of fraternal
relation, articulated as a vertical, specifically sovereign, relation by
Thomas Hobbes (1968) before him in the Leviathan, as the ‘relation
between protection and obedience’ (Schmitt 1996: 96), would find a
sympathetic legal voice in the United States of America Declaration of
Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Of the Citizen (1789). In these documents liberal man would come
to know that he could be protected from the state, by the state, through
the apparatus of the Rule of Law, and the exercise, or at least recognition
of his rights. This moment can be seen to inaugurate the conundrums
of ‘psychoanalytic man’ struggling under the rules of the oppressive
primal father, in Freud’s myth of the origin of law, a century later (Freud
2001). This is not only because the situations speak to oppression but,
because — heralding the fantasy of Enlightenment — rights and the
death of the father promise a condition that is otherwise to subjection.
In Freud’s discussion of the ‘primal horde’ he suggests that society
existed mythically — but in our imagination as originally — in a form
where the ‘primal father’ could do as he pleased. His freedom included
sexual access to his daughters, to his son’s wives, to his sisters. Indeed,
the condition of the father in this originary scene is that of limitless
freedom to satiate his desire, and of a violent oppression exercised
over his sons. The sons, unhappy with this situation, kill the father in
order that they may have a kind of sovereignty, one could say, over
their own possessions, including wives, property, and so on. What
remains in the terrain of the dead father is not an absolute sovereign,
however, but many sovereigns whose limits are dictated by the
sovereignty of the brother next door if you like. The limit must then be
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imposed on all the (other) brothers — in the fashion of the Millian
‘harm principle’ — so that no individual had limitless access, but no
individual (man) could be usurped of his possessions by an-other. A
kind of fraternal contract.
This is a myth of origin, and of course it is a myth (otherwise there
might be some confusion about the position of the primal father’s father),
but it is a myth of sovereignty. A myth about the position of the king,
head of state, feudal lord and so on and ‘his’ access to the other (man’s)
property, and the limits on ‘man’ in his access to the sovereign’s
property, that is, his capacity to inaugurate, endure and surpass his
own, or another’s laws.
 While Freud’s myth suggests origin and resolution, western, or
European ‘man’ has always had to struggle with the prohibitive demands
of the sovereign. The French Declaration however, offered, in legal
discourse, the possibility that he could thwart the limitless freedom of
the sovereign and thereby the absolute prohibition on his own
sovereignty.9 The French Declaration suggested that it was not a
sovereign right to utilise subjects arbitrarily; that the rights of the
sovereign and that of man were in dialogue, or at least in relation. In
the French Declaration there exists the possibility of killing the
oppressive father of the primal horde, perhaps not always, or absolutely,
but sometimes, in the interests of political, and what has come to be
human, rights. The aftermath of this possibility, the confusion of what
to do with this new egalitarian freedom, would require some
psychoanalytic assistance however.
The French Declaration would form the foundations for the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
(UN 1948), and continues the articulation of the conditions of the liberal
subject in its struggle for freedom in relation to something we might
call, in line with Hobbes read by Schmitt, a ‘sovereign-representative
person’ (Schmitt 1996: 97-8). The confusion of this struggle would
later be articulated by Freud’s patients and documented in his many
discussions of the conditions of the human in its relation to the parent,
and/as law; one of which being, of course ‘A Child is Being Beaten’
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(Freud 2001).10 Lacan would also later consider the imprint of the
sovereign-representative person in his discussion of the ‘name-of-the-
father’ (Lacan 2006: 30), ‘Mirror Stage’, (Lacan 2006: 75-81) and his
broader discussions of the importance of the Oedipal influence, and
the production of the subject’s reality through language (Lacan 1977).
Freud’s engagements with the struggle of the subject in relation to
its freedom before the father as sovereign were seemingly formulated
in the foreground of the liberal political discourse of arguments such
as those of Rousseau who suggests:
The oldest of all societies and the only natural one, is that of the family;
yet children remain tied to their father by nature and so long as they need
him for their preservation ... as soon as [the son] reaches the age of reason,
he becomes the only judge of the best means to preserve him; he becomes
his own master [he kills off the father]. The family may therefore be seen
as the first model of political societies: the head of the state bears the
image of the father, the people the image of his children and all being free
and equal surrender their freedom only when they see advantage in doing
so (1968: 50-1).
Rousseau’s belief in the freedom of the subject relies on the
presumption that the advantage is ‘seen’ and surrendered, from the
vantage of being already free of the influence of subjection to the family,
or the head of state. This may have been more true in 1762, when there
was a possibility of existing before the ‘social contract’ came into
practice. That is, where the subject might have had a say in the immanent
advantage of installing the social contract.
In 1948 however, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
would put these concerns into legal circulation, a contract with the
democratic sovereign had been inescapable in democratic nations, for
many generations, and a contract with the free market was becoming
globally inescapable.11 Despite this in Article 1 the Declaration states:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights [and, in the
manner of the Kantian sovereign moral subject] [t]hey are endowed with
reason and conscience (1951).12
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In psychoanalysis it is precisely this endowment, however, which
tampers with the first premise of freedom and equality. As it is precisely
the problem with the subject’s perception, as ‘seeing advantage’, in
surrendering freedom to an imagined sovereign-representative person
as a state of ‘reason and conscience’ that Freud, and later Lacan, engaged
in their analytic practice and theory.
In psychoanalysis freedom is arguably internal, it is seen from a
position of existing as and within the social contract, and (spatially)
before the father. The struggle for the subject of analysis goes beyond
the sovereign’s limits, in its application of law. The struggle is with a
sovereign-representative person as an object of the transference of
feelings of prosecution, persecution or prohibition. This articulates with
Wendy Brown’s explanation of sovereignty:
Sovereignty is a peculiar border concept — not only demarking the
boundaries of an entity (as in jurisdictional sovereignty) but, through this
demarcation, setting terms and organizing the space both inside and outside
the entity (2007: 4).
Thus, what we call feelings are internalised as what Lacan would
call codes (Lacan 2006: 495-6), which produce other thoughts, fantasies,
anxieties, and behaviour that limit the subject, of his own accord.
The (Lacanian) Other is not outside the subject but ‘at the most
assented to heart of my identity to myself he pulls the strings’ (Lacan
2006: 436). That is, the Other instantiates limits inside, to use Brown’s
terminology. The limit is the relation between the internal and external
jurisdiction of the sovereign-Other. For Brown this is what it means to
set the terms and organise the space inside as the ‘internal’ of the subject
as ‘the entity’; it is the sovereign who is setting the terms a priori the
subject. The United Nations notion of being ‘born free’ is then obviously
relational and perhaps contingent on the capacity of the subject to affect
the sovereign, or to affect its own sovereignty.
The psychoanalytic subject struggles to tamper with its own freedom
and with that of others, because it is always already subjectified through
the parameters of the subject’s relation to others, including, and perhaps
especially the sovereign-Other. It is no coincidence then that the
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psychoanalytic discourses adopted a foundational interest in the
subject’s relation to freedom through a consideration of its relation to
the sovereign-representative person as a kind of father, and extended
this interest to the use of language as the ‘name of the father’.13 This
then evokes the very questionable capacity for ‘free speech’, or the
freedom in the use of the name (of the father).
Freedom ex nihilo
The conditions of sovereignty in contemporary legal discourse reinforce
the presentation of the subject’s free speech and indeed free decision
to contract ex nihilo through the demand for the participation of all
parties equally and freely, all parties as sovereign we could say. And
this is certainly the status of Rousseau’s subjects in the social contract
who, ‘being free and equal surrender their freedom only when they see
advantage in doing so’ (Rousseau 1968: 50-1). This is reiterated in the
UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights which suggests that
people should be able to return to a state of freedom and equality by
being ‘free from want and fear’ (UN 1948: 1). We might think of this
freedom as a lack of alienation; or in Lacanese, a ‘lack of lack’.
The lack of lack is what, despite their differences in sovereign
representation, Rousseau, Hobbes and Schmitt might call ‘natural
freedom’ (Schmitt 1996: 96) or ‘natural liberty’ (Rousseau 1968: 65).
From this position the individual can contract to be in a state of ‘civil
freedom’, to be protected by the state by virtue of their obedience to
the ‘general will’. As Rousseau says:
[L]aws are acts of the general will ... no longer ask how we can both be
free and subject to laws, for the laws are but registers of what we ourselves
desire (1968: 82).
This is precisely the gesture that Peter Goodrich explains as the
mirrored identification of the subject with the rhetoric of law when he
states:
[T]he legal speech or text had to identify its audience or constituency, and
provide that audience or those hearers with such symbols, images, icons or
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figures as would allow communication in its classical or at least
etymological sense of communion (1994: 110).
In this identification, or communion, it is impossible to distinguish
between the legal speech provided by the legal institution and what
‘we ourselves desire’. In the fashion of communion the bread becomes
the flesh of Christ because it is believed to be so. But Rousseau claims
otherwise.
Desire, for Rousseau, is freely possessed. While the will of the
citizen is alienated to the general will, desire (to do so, to alienate) is
never alienated. And, for Hobbes explained through Schmitt:
The covenant was conceived in an entirely individualistic manner; all ties
and groupings are dissolved; fear brought atomized individuals together a
spark of [Kantian] reason flashed, and a consensus about security emerged
... [T]he state is more than and something different from a covenant
concluded by individuals; for although it results in forging consensus of
all with all, in essence, it is not a state, but only a social covenant (1996:
97).
It is not individuals who contract for Hobbes, but it is nevertheless
individuals who ‘conclude’ to be in a covenant with the ‘sovereign-
representative person’ (1996: 93-8). The Kantian reason emerges and
produces the conclusion because of a spark that comes from an unknown
location but is nevertheless inspired by a fear of (what becomes in
1922) a Schmittian enemy (Schmitt 1985: 26-7). This is not an a priori
fear however, it is what emerges at the point that the political is
articulated, and precisely for Schmitt this is the sovereign’s jurisdiction.
Thus, the individual’s spark is inspired, or even demanded, by the limit
of the state defined by normative political parameters that articulate an
external enemy. In this sense the spark and the state are simultaneous
and certainly, in a psychoanalytic paradigm, the sovereign and the
enemy are but two entities which betray, and further inaugurate, the
fragmentation of the subject.
Desire for Rousseau and the spark of fear for Hobbes and Schmitt
imply an autonomy of reason; something more than conscious that is
somehow outside the parameters of the subject always already before
163
Who’s your Daddy?
law; desire ex nihilo. The subject contracts autonomously, as if it can
be a sovereign-representative person of itself, literally before law’s
existence; dues mortalis in Hobbes’ terms, prior to even the conception
of God. This prior conception of desire is indistinct in both Hobbes
and Rousseau, despite their differences. The positive freedom of
Rousseau and the negative freedom of Hobbes both exist within the
context of a presupposition of a capacity to experience freedom prior
to the sovereign’s existence. This is not a question of political autonomy,
for both explanations of the status of political subjects articulate a limit.
It is a question of a priori desire, or of the subject’s own sovereign
capacity to conclude. And, it is this sovereign capacity to conclude,
beyond the sovereign’s desire, and the desire to do so, or do otherwise,
that psychoanalysis speaks to, for desire is the jurisdiction of the
unconscious, and the sovereign’s love is not quantifiable as positive or
negative love.
Kant and Lacan
The capacity to enact an desire ex nihilo is importantly also questionable
in a Kantian discussion of Reason. The distinction between Kant’s
notion of Reason emanating (hopefully, for Kant) from a subject who
has embraced the moral requirements of the social and Lacan’s notion
of servitude to language are subtle, but are best understood temporally.
For Kant there is an infantile condition prior to Reason in which freedom
is not a political or rational freedom, but a condition that is what Lacan
might call an articulation of wants. For Lacan this condition is already
an entertainment of reason — Kantian or otherwise — that the subject
assumes. Reason, prior to its performance socially, is driven. Literally.
Freedom, for Lacan is a product of a relation between the drives and
language (Lacan 1977, 2006).14 The one does not conquer the other in
Kantian fashion, but language, as the articulation of sociality, is in a
condition of ‘servitude’, or, in service of the drives of the subject. The
drives, as pleasure or death (Lacan 1977: 161-87), thus produce the
very texture of the Reason that Kant extols. The drives and Reason are
not only a priori but the former produces the conditions of Reason.
This, however, is not the whole story.
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For Kant Reason pre-exists the subject and is something one adopts,
if you like. Reason is particular, however, just as the Symbolic Order,
for Lacan, or the context in which the social is articulated, provides the
conditions for a particular sociality. Its particularity, again, is driven
by the baseness of infantile desire, by the drives entwined with the
prohibitions of law. The distinction between Kant and Lacan here is
temporal because Kant would privilege Reason before infantile wants,
while for Lacan the wants produce the articulation of that very Reason,
or what then comes to be law. Hence, when the social is articulated as
the political and archived, in Shoshana Felman’s terms, as the ‘juridical
unconscious’ (2002), it assumes the violence of the drives. This context
for law does not differ from the field of Reason from which a Kantian
subject is supposed to draw, or to make a rational choice.15 Indeed, this
choice is defined, or driven by the trauma of the imaginary; the very
scene of the drives. This is precisely why Lacan does not distinguish
between the Marquis de Sade and Emmanuel Kant for both their
positions — of absolute violence and absolute duty — are a product of
the violence of the drives.
The discussion of, and distinction between, a Kantian and Lacanian
contemplation of subjectivity is crucial to the question of a prior
servitude to either the drives or indeed the morality of Kantian Reason.
These questions are played out in the terrain of sovereign prohibition.
Prohibition is, for Lacan, to what the imaginary refers (if not
articulates).16 If not in positivistic law, then at least in the fantasy of
what prohibition signifies. The sovereign’s terms can be understood as
the terms qua names of the father. The Lacanian notion of imaginary
servitude refers to a service to both the image of the father saying no,
and it refers to an image that one need be prohibited from. This might
arguably be understood as what Goodrich explains as the ‘other scene’
of law (Goodrich 1994: 109). This is the Oedipal scene that evokes the
pending prohibition, or at least the fear of the violence of the paternal,
and arguably sovereign’s, law.
This is why Lacan would say in his Seminar XI commentary on the
killing of the primal father, that God is not dead ‘God is unconscious’
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(Lacan 1977: 59), for the killing of the primal father, performed by the
brothers in the ‘primal horde’, offers them freedom to supposedly do
as they please, but not freedom to feel as they please — or as Lacan
would have it — imagine as they please. God is unconscious because
the brothers now must produce and perform their own limits, and this
they do because of unconscious guilt. Thus, their feelings (of guilt)
inhabit their desires, and hence their freedom; whether I am doing the
‘right thing’, or perhaps that I might be doing the ‘wrong thing’ in the
gaze of the sovereign-representative-person evokes this guilt. This is
independent of a sovereign imposition on their freedom.
The sovereign/father is not dead but implanted, if you like. In the
mode of the Lacanian Other, and from this position, defines the subject’s
‘free choice’; this is precisely why Lacan speaks of the subject in its
‘imaginary servitude’. We might therefore say that guilt is there a priori
in the liberal subject who has freedom to choose within the limits of
the law, but whose choice is now limited by not only positive law’s
limits, but the limits of their own desire.
Notions such as not wanting or desiring to commit a crime, kill,
exploit, rape or steal from one’s neighbour and therefore experiencing
the ‘general will’ as a product of the subject’s own desires, is from this
vantage a nonsense. Not only because of ‘man’s fundamental
aggressions’. As Freud says:
Man tries to satisfy his need for aggression at the expense of his neighbour,
to exploit his work without compensation, to use him sexually without his
consent, to appropriate his goods, to humiliate him, to inflict suffering on
him, to torture and kill him (1961: 111).
But, because the desire is produced in the subject’s relation with
the sovereign-Other. Indeed, because psychoanalysis cannot be said to
offer a universal articulation of the subject prior to Enlightenment, this
desire might arguably be a product of precisely the Enlightenment as
an antagonistic arrangement with the sovereign. Regardless, the
subject’s contract with the sovereign cannot be understood to reflect
the distinction between civil liberty and natural liberty, as Rousseau
would have us believe. For natural liberty is a priori civil liberty, the
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subject’s desire is a product of its relation with the (dead) father qua
sovereign-representative person.
As Schmitt says of the subjugation enacted in Hobbes’ Leviathan,
it is ‘fear’ that brings subjects together in order to ‘conclude’, or ‘the
accumulated anguish of individuals who fear for their lives brings about
a new power, [aka the sovereign-representative person]’(Schmitt 1996:
98). What remains untheorised and unanalysed, prior to psychoanalytic
intervention, is the texture of this person, and the texture of this fear.
The internalised fear is subject to continuing question, and therefore
so is the political status of freedom itself in a liberal democracy.
Psychoanalysis, in its parallel engagement with the discourse of freedom
of the liberal subject, mutatis mutandis, offers some thoughts. Indeed,
if Lacan is right psychoanalysis alone recognises this knot.
The sovereign Other of tomorrow
The capacity of the subject to exercise what we’ve come to call freedom,
as speech or otherwise, is dependent on its imagined relation, or service
to the father (dead or alive) qua sovereign (representative person). This
is precisely the relation which engages the imaginary servitude of the
subject. This is importantly an imaginary relation, which explains some
of the contemporary fascination with the location of the sovereign and
its performance.17 The fascination with locating the sovereign mirrors
the desperation to locate the codes of desirability fantasised as emanating
from the Other. The success of this endeavour is experienced, at least
momentarily, as relief — or enjoyment — for the subject in its service
to the Other. In Goodrich’s terms this is achieved by identification
with the law’s rhetoric; in Schmitt’s terms it is not incurring the wrathful
(abandoning) exceptionality of the sovereign decision; and for Rousseau
it is aligning with what the sovereign will want tomorrow. Success
relies, however, on knowing the coordinates which point to s/he who
decides.
The sovereign, head of state, the father and the Lacanian Other,
function for the subject in distinct but overlapping ways. The sovereign
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and ‘head of state’ are not collapsible. And it is in the difficulty of
locating the sovereign to the subject, and its relation therewith, that
psychoanalysis speaks to. Rousseau’s definitions offer a starting point
for this endeavour. As he explains:
[I]n the place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of
association creates an artificial and corporate body composed of as many
members as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that
body acquires its unity, its common ego, its life and its will ... the public
person ... in its passive role is called the state, when it/ plays an active role
it is called the sovereign ... those who are associated in it take collectively
the name of a people (1968: 61-2, his italic, my underline).
The ‘common ego’ that Rousseau describes here is the location
from which the sovereign speaks. This commonality is imagined,
however, for it is common ... where? There is no location for this
presence consistently because the commonality of it dictates that it is
located where the ‘life’ and ‘will’ of the ‘people’ are fantasised as
emanating. Post the 1789 French Declaration and the instantiation of
what has come to be called, in the fashion of Michel Foucault, a
‘disciplinary conception of power’.18 The impossible locus of power:
has meant not so much that sovereignty is an outdated or meaningless
concept, but simply that the sovereign becomes more difficult to identify
(2006: 137).
Rousseau in 1762 saw the problematic of identification as located
in the impossibility of delegation of will. He states:
[S]overeignty, being nothing other than the exercise of the general will,
can never be alienated; and that the sovereign, which is simply a collective
being, cannot be represented by anything but itself — power may be
delegated, but the will cannot be (1968:69).
Thus, the sovereign could certainly be the head of the state, the
Prime Minister, President, King, or father, but Rousseau’s configuration
disallows, not this possibility, but this possibility as an enduring




[W]hile it is not impossible for a private will to coincide with the general
will on some point or other, it is impossible for such a coincidence to be
regular and enduring; ... The sovereign might say: ‘What I want is precisely
what this man wants’ ... but no sovereign could say: ‘What this man is
going to want tomorrow I too shall want’ (1968: 69-70, my emphasis).
In disallowing the certainty of a futurity to the sovereign decision
Rousseau, in a gesture prescient with the concerns of psychoanalysis,
articulates the uncertainty of the psychoanalytic subject who does not
consistently know the immanent codes of the Other. Codes which offer
the coordination of its own subjectivity. Rousseau’s sovereign is a
product of general will, but a will which points to an (un)certain futurity
of an arriving judgment. It is an anxiety in the unconscious of the subject
because, if the subject does not know the coordinates of the limiting
ego qua sovereign, then it cannot know the parameters of its freedom.
The (un)certain decision
The articulation of the sovereign’s decision in legal speech assists, in
part, with knowing what the legal sovereign might want tomorrow.
However, this certainty is not enduring. The sovereign decision is
beyond the parameters of the law articulated through the standard head
of state, or indeed the prescriptions of God. These can be known, albeit
arbitrarily interpreted. It is however, the terrain of the sovereign
‘decision’ articulated by Schmitt as the decision on the ‘exception’ or
the ‘exceptional case’ (Schmitt 1996b: 5). A decision that, while related
to the Rule of Law, can overcome it arbitrarily. That is, the Rule of Law
is not set over the sovereign. This renders the subject in a condition of
subjective and indeed castrative anxiety. For a concern with the
sovereign who can cut, maim, imprison or kill the subject arbitrarily is
the very status of the child before the castrating parent; a parent who is
always potentially displeased.
We can see the status of this exceptionality in Rousseau’s
explanation of the sovereign’s condition in that ‘it would be against
the very nature of a political body for the sovereign to set over itself a
law which it cannot infringe’ (Rousseau 1968: 62). The sovereign’s
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will cannot be known through recourse to any law. But, because of the
sovereign’s will not being subject to law, or not subject to a known
futurity, the arrival of the will, as (dis)pleasure, is always already
uncertain. This is of course why Schmitt offers the exceptional
decisionism of sovereignty as ‘the sovereign is he who decides on the
exception’ (Schmitt 1996b: 4), a configuration which re-enforces the
sovereign’s certainty and the subject’s lack (of it).
The condition of the sovereign decision, in the same manner as the
castrative function of paternal law, inaugurates two points of
conditionality for the liberal subject. First, that the decision may be
exercised by a sovereign-Other and second, that at some point — in
the future — it will arrive beyond the known parameters of law. This is
an important temporal feature of the sovereign’s will (that I’ll belabour
to make the psychoanalytic connection). The decision is first of all the
promise of a certainty that will — at least at some point — arrive,
insofar as the sovereign does make effective decisions; decisions
through which the subject may live or die. The originary authority of
law, articulated by Jacques Derrida (1990)19 alludes to the concern of
the immanence of this decision in the subject. Law’s certainty is always
potentially (newly) arriving.
The subject, however, is always uncertain about where this ‘will’
will arrive, next; but it knows the decision of the sovereign is immanent.
The sovereign isn’t to-come, s/he is coming. An exceptional decision
could/can/will certainly arrive. But, it is an exceptional decision which
authorises the sovereign and thus provides potentially new parameters
of freedom for the subject in its relation to law; new limits if you like.
The anxiety for the subject is because the sovereign, as a product
of the subject’s necessary alienation, is the location of a future known,
and a known imagined held by the sovereign. The importance of this
configuration for psychoanalysis is that the Other is perceived precisely
to know. Lacan’s examinations of the relation with the ‘subject-
supposed-to-know’ suggest, mutatis mutandis that the sovereign is
assumed to offer the master’s discourse (Lacan 1998: 17-19); the
capacity to judge the correct mode of being for the subject. The
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sovereign’s capacity and the subject’s relation are articulated thus for
Rousseau when he states:
[E]ach man alienates by the social pact only that part of his power, his
goods and his liberty which is the concern of the community; but it must
also be admitted that the sovereign alone is judge of what is of such concern
(1968: 74, my emphasis).
Therefore, while the subject alienates his power, his liberty — as a
fundamental element of a politically and socially desirable, liberal
subjectivity — the sovereign does not, indeed, he cannot, alienate his
power. He, like the Other, is the receptacle of this alienation, as for
Lacan, ‘he pulls the strings’.
If the sovereign is not subject to the Rule and can thus impose new
limits on the subject’s freedom then there is nothing, for the liberal
subject, who is not under the fascist dictatorship of the primal father
— having killed him — which secures a prior certainty of freedom’s
limits. Remonstrations gesturing to the importance of the Rule of Law
can then be seen as the articulation of, in part, insecurities about the
sovereign’s future decision. The Rule of Law becomes the tool by which
to subject the sovereign to the will of precedent or law’s pedigree (non-
exceptionism) through the pretension to an originary Rule.
It could also be argued that law’s contemporary ‘frenetic legislative
activity’, discussed by Costas Douzinas (2000: 329) and extrapolated
to the repetition of international law, by Anne Orford (2004), are
attempts to encapsulate any possible new qua exceptional decision by
the sovereign. In Orford’s psychoanalytic rendition of international
law’s crisis of authority, repetition functions to overcome the anxiety
about this lack of knowing. Repetition, in a Lacanian frame is the
exercise of never being careful enough (Lacan 1977: 61) in an effort to
capture what Lacan calls the Real. It is the Real, however, that is ever
present in a sovereign decision that one cannot know tomorrow; the
Real is precisely what exceeds the Rule of Law or, indeed, legislation.
In this sense ‘frenetic’ speech of law, or the attempt to capture an
authorative foundation for international law represents the possibility
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of thwarting the immanent decision and the unknowable Real. Locating
the sovereign, suring up the authority of an entity such as international
law, or making new laws is an effort to locate the coordinates from
where the decision qua cut will come. The sovereign decision can never
be set over by any law, no matter how repetitive or how frenetic, is
thus the political form of castration; the gesture which inaugurates the
Real.
God’s terms
The sovereign is imagined to have the capacity to castrate, but also the
capacity, if his/her love is secured, to offer a way out of castration. For
Schmitt, ‘[t]he sovereign ... is in the position of a private person making
a contract with himself’ (Rousseau 1968: 62). Receiving, but never
alienating. This is the position of God whose onto-political rendering
can inaugurate the subject as killed, but also as able to be sacrificed (or
not) (Agamben 1998: 8). This tension is articulated in Schmitt’s
summation of Hobbes, as the position of a mortal god (Schmitt 1996:
92). This mortal god [deus mortalis], as the third cog in the tri-
partitioning of the state articulated by Hobbes is the figure who struggles
to identify (perhaps narcissistically) with the terms of God and thus
thwart castration, or indeed abandonment.
Mortal god is a kind of internalising of the sovereign-representative
person in man; the freedom for man to decide within the parameters,
the legal limits, of the sovereign. In the condition of deus mortalis in
the Leviathan, man can decide for himself, but his decision is not only
limited within the laws of the state but informed by the name of the
father, or he is god in and on God’s terms. The decision of man is
archived, articulated and conceived in the language of the Other as
God, or the sovereign. What psychoanalysis offers to this condition,
however, is that these terms always leave a remainder. This remainder
is both the hovering and immanent Real qua decision as that which is
yet to be articulated by either the sovereign or the subject. In this duo
there is always a surplus, a particle even a right, which is yet to be
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articulated. A piece that offers the fantasy of alignment or indeed love
of the father; a particle potentially in economic exchange with the
sovereign-Other which returns the subject to the body politic as whole.
The possibility of deus mortalis as a theological configuration
gestures to this object in exchange. The subject is subject in the terms
of God. However, the importance of departing from theorists who
recognise the condition of the western subject as a Christian condition
is precisely because of the economic particle — as the yet articulated
remainder of these terms — which offers the fantasy of sanction by the
Other, or indeed by the sovereign. The contemporary liberal subject is
certainly required to perform a Christian ontology — to forgive, to
care, ‘to love thy neighbour as thyself’ (Lacan 1992: 187) — but the
relation with God is performative of a relation of Being in or out, if
you like. It denies what has now become the trope of a liberal, and
certainly a capitalist subjectivity; the objects in exchange.
The Christian configuration of the relation of subject to the state is
economic in itself, as Jennifer Beard (2006) has eloquently pointed
out, but, the Christian economic relation is not a contract in which one
can engage parts of oneself. In its status as a Christian subject wrestling
with good and evil — being allocated heaven or hell — it is an ‘all or
nothing’ ontology. This is precisely because the choices are one or the
other after death. Enlightenment man, and psychoanalytic man, assumes
a partiality to the contract. Indeed, this is what rights are, and this is
what the speech of the narcissistically identified subject performs in
economic circulation with the legal institution. This is the partial and
particalised aspect of the human in contract with sovereign.
In this last section I will offer both a theory of what might actually
be exchanged — and thereby potentially suture the subject to the social,
or the child to the father, or deus mortalis to Deus — in the contract
with a whimsical sovereign, and I want to explain what remains in the
(abandoned) body of the subject that cannot be exchanged. The relation
of sovereign to subject is one of, what I am calling, particalisation, a
texture in which a piece is exchanged, and one that — at least for
psychoanalysis — depicts a textured, if imagined, relation with the
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sovereign as Other. This is both the condition of rights in a liberal
democratic land and it is the condition of speech for a (particularly
Lacanian) psychoanalytic subject. Rights, speech and product circulate
in a consumptive economy that promises the acquisition of the
sovereign’s desire, if not love.
For Rousseau the alienation he speaks of, as the condition of ‘man’,
is ‘to sell’ a part of himself, but it is clearly a reciprocal exchange in
which the subject — at least in a liberal state — is represented as being
able to achieve his freedom to choose, before the law, in return. Unlike
being before God (or contemporary capitalism), Rousseau imagined a
choice beyond the contract. Not just an affinity with God or Satan but
a radically other location that may be beyond the economies of contract.
This other location is not limbo, but a more contemporary jurisdiction
in which the subject imagines the alienating of a particle of itself as an
authorised loss. The subject does not contract freely but the piece,
once alienated, is imagined to circulate without injury, without loss.
That is, it circulates to align not to alienate.
The fantasy of non-alienation, or non-castration, is both a
psychoanalytic terrain for analysis and it is a liberal capitalist exercise
(and advertisement) in which a consumptive economics both promises
and betrays the fantasy of acquisition. Or, purchase promises both the
enactment of free desire and the attainment of contentment as the
attainment of the piece that will fill the lack. In psychoanalysis this is
the fantasy of the collation of the elusive fragments that are desperately
(and interminably) being imagined as a unified whole, as the
performance of ontological mastery. This is the very gesture of the
Lacanian infant who stands before the mirror and imagines the
possibility of unity in the gaze of the Other (Lacan 2006: 75-81). It is
also the gesture of the liberal subject who stands before the legal
institution and imagines the possibility of unity — as a mastery of its
fragmenting ontology — in the gaze of the sovereign. But this mastery
requires language, and in a neo-liberal world of (human) rights which
proclaims the virtue of the ‘free and equal’ human as a universal
imperative, and ‘free speech’ as the promise of democracy, the fantasy
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of a mastery of the particle that can be exchanged without loss, without
injury or without subjection, requires an alignment with the language
of liberal law. The dominant mode of this language, since 1789, is
rights.
Rights in exchange
To say ‘I have rights’, as either an objection or assent to the sovereign’s
behaviour is one, quite obvious, performance of ontology in the mirror
image of the right legal subject. In this articulation — even in its
demonstration against the sovereign — what might be lost functions to
return the subject as someone it could always potentially be in futurity,
if you like. The subject may not have rights now but a claim for their
necessity suggests the promise of their arrival in the future. The subject
of rights is thus reflected in the sovereign’s terms. The rights function
as something — as particle(s) — that could be returned to the subject
to complete its ontology. The belief in this possibility, however, is the
articulation of a fantasy that one can know what the sovereign will
want tomorrow; that rights are always in circulation and that the
sovereign will set this law over itself always. This belief is a disavowal
that the sovereign could decide otherwise.
The proclamation of being a subject in the mirror image of the
sovereign’s jurisdic-form is further, and perhaps more precisely,
performed in the realm of neo-liberalism’s cleave to capitalist discourse.
This can be seen even in forms of political dissent that claim to deny
the very structure they mirror. In a recent demonstration against the
meeting of the G20 in Melbourne I witnessed subjects in a kind of
narcissistic dissent to the G20 meeting. At the event of the protest the
Victorian ‘riot police’ blocked the roads leading to the meeting. Large
groups of protesters took up the chant ‘Whose streets? Our Streets.
Whose streets? Our Streets.’ in apparent opposition to the blockade.
The mode of this opposition to the aggressive presence of riot police




The claims to ownership of land qua streets, inherent in the chant
‘Our streets’, articulates a contemporary judicial and economic
imaginary that underpins (post) colonial Australia. This chant, both
oddly out of sinc with the Australian High Court’s (1992) ruling against
British claims to Australia being terra nullius (empty land) in Mabo v
Queensland (hereafter Mabo), was also disturbingly in parallel with
Justice Brennan’s claims in the judgment that the ‘skeletal principle of
the law need be upheld’. The chant, like the assertion in the judgment
upholds a notion of prior ownership of land by a (largely white)
protesting crowd. The streets remain empty land, to be claimed by legal
speech, or to be claimed by white protestors who uphold the skeletal
principle of private white ownership. The Mabo judgment and its
insistency on a skeletal privilege for British primacy also frames the
context for Indigenous Native Title applications in daily contest in the
courts and Land Rights for (traditional) owners of Australia. ‘Our
streets’, as a claim to prior and private ownership, articulate at one and
the same time, the very claim of the sovereign that indigenous land
belongs to the (dominantly white) protesters, and that claims to dissent
need be framed in the discourse of the (capitalist) state.
In this frame the speech of the dissenting subject mirrors that of the
sovereign. Indeed, the speech of the protesters promises, as least in
one sense, the futurity of a sovereign decision that will authorise
ownership. The dissent attempts an articulation of the ‘other scene’ of
law in the very contentious and problematic terms of sovereign speech,
but a speech which aligns — alarmingly accurately — with the ‘names
of the father’. In these terms the ‘hidden depth’, that points to the
love’s of the law is the economically valuable — the mirroring —
fragments that inhere in the protesters’ speech.
In this performance, even in the subject’s dissatisfaction qua dissent,
there is the promise of no lack. The names of the father are, in this
sense, the language of the state and just as the ‘law of the father
equiparates with that of the sovereign’ (Goodrich 1994: 108) the
articulation of the language of the sovereign-Other promises a thwarting
of the prohibitive, persecutory, or abandoning potentiality of the
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sovereign decision. This is of course a fantasy, for the sovereign has
no ‘set over itself a law which it cannot infringe’, but the fantasy of
alignment with the language of the capitalist, liberal state is a fantasy
of alignment with the sovereign’s desire and thus, a fantasy of securing
law’s love.
Conclusion
The psychoanalytic subject, far from being universal, can be seen as
culture specific to the West insofar as the concerns of Freud, his peers
and inheritors, articulate the political discourse emerging in the 18th
century in Europe. Psychoanalysis’ fundamental texts mirror western
concerns with the relation of the subject to the sovereign, or the
individual to its freedom to exist as free before an imagined aggressive,
decision making, and potentially persecuting Other. Psychoanalytic
concerns thus parallel, and arguably contribute to, the production of
the liberal subject wrangling with its autonomy qua freedom in the
West. This wrangle can be seen in discursive forms which have
emanated from Europe in the 18th century and permeate the cultural
present as the concerns of the West. They are then dispersed in the
‘white diaspora’ (Osurie and Banerjee 2004: 167) that is capitalism
and colonialism, and in the mechanics of what has come to be called
globalisation or ‘development’, including the globalisation of
psychoanalysis.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s concerns about using psychoanalysis
‘that is so culture specific in its provenance’ (Spivak 1993: 177) as a
method of understanding the psyche, or, to consider the formation of
the subject, alert us importantly to the potential danger of collapsing,
what she describes as a ‘collective fantasy [as] symptomatic of a
collective itinerary’ (Spivak 1999: 284) as so much psychoanalytic
work on the social does. Spivak’s concern resonates with the critique
of Slavoj Ž iŽek’s offered by Judith Butler in respect to his Lacanian
methods of articulating and analysing the social (Butler et al 2000:
26). The ‘collective itinerary’ analysed in much wild psychoanalytic
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discourse is all too readily assumed as a universal itinerary and thus
discount the alterity of those who were not ‘developed’ by
psychoanalysis or indeed through neo-liberal interventions.
Spivak’s concerns, however, also point to the possibility of using
psychoanalysis that is precisely ‘culture specific’. Indeed, we can apply
the turn that Spivak makes about Marxism, claiming that it is different
to discuss economic modes of production — consolidated as global
capitalism — than to discuss ‘the machinery production and
performance of the mental theatre’ (Spivak 1996: 177), or a collective
psyche (Spivak 1994: 284). Indeed we can suggest, adopting precisely
Spivak’s Marxist modality, that psychoanalysis and the performance
of a neo-liberal politics internationally, engages a mode of subject
production in which the surplus of this arrangement is speech and in
fact, the legal speech of rights. This speech both affirms the authority
of the sovereign and promises to return the aligning subject to the status
of desirable subject.
The economic speech of the aligning subject, articulated in the image
of the sovereign as the terms of God, are thus a production that both
the liberal sovereign and the psychoanalyst profit from. The liberal
subject assumes a share in this profit if it organises its labour in the
mode of the free individual with, or anticipating, rights or engaging so
called ‘free speech’. The future security of this position is, however, a
fantasy that denies the futurity of the sovereign decision and it denies
the castrative function of paternal law. The sovereign decides, the father
will be displeased, language is the language of the Other. Product
purchase, claims to rights and the performance of dissent will not alter
the reality that we do not know what the sovereign will want tomorrow
and that the love of the law is flighty, fickle and is without regular and
enduring desire.
Notes
1 This paper was presented at the conference of ‘Law and Literature: Passages’
at Melbourne University July 2006. The comments I received there
organised some of the themes of this article, particularly those from Bill
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MacNeil. Thanks also to Andy Schaap for comments on an earlier draft. I
have borrowed some of the phrasing from this conversation from Andy,
but any of the mistakes I have made in extrapolation are of course my own.
2 Lacan’s discussions of castration are numerous. The best examples for the
purposes of the context in which I’m speaking are in Seminar XI (1977).
3 Lacan’s discussion of the Other appears throughout his body of work. It is
best explained in the relation to the subject as ‘man’s desire is the Other’s
desire [le desir de l’omme est le desir de l’Autre]’ (Lacan 2006: 690). This
configuration is explained through Lacan’s graphs in which the subject
always asks the Other Che vuoi? What do you want? As a method of
formulating the subject’s own desire via the imagined desire of the Other.
4 Lacan noted that ‘Psychoanalysis has played a role in the direction of
modern subjectivity’ (2006: 285), and we could argue, continues to play a
role in the subjection of the subject, both in the West and through a neo-
liberal diaspora.
5 To the best of my knowledge there has been little empirical or theoretical
interrogation done on the use of psychoanalysis as a universal tool. Most
of us who enter this field merely hope that it resonates universally. This
largely avoids the problem of it colonising where it falls, or creating its
own resonances against which behaviours — political or otherwise — are
measured. See Derrida particularly on this concern (1998: 65-90).
6 Of course Agamben’s concern — as a question of the conditions of homo
sacer — is precisely not a theological concern insofar as the question of
‘sacrifice’ as opposed to being killed is a political, not a religious condition.
However, to be or not to be homo sacer is a contemporary concern of a
liberal subject and, like the concern with a Christian ontology, homo sacer
evokes the image of a unified ontological condition. As I’ll explain, one is
either in or out of hell, purgatory, heaven or the polis (Agamben 1998).
7 Psychosis, neurosis and perversion are the three structures Lacan suggests
all subjects can be understood to adopt in order to arrange their desire
around the primal scene, or the ‘paternal no’ articulated in the primal scene
(2006).
8 The argument in relation to ‘conditioning’ has been well made in discussion
of communitarianism in relation to Kant. For a discussion of these debates
see Sanjay Seth (2001).
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9 I’m retaining the gendered pronoun here, briefly, for its accuracy. Generally
I will assume the Lacanian form of ‘it’ to designate the subject.
10 In this text, and others such as ‘Group Psychology’ (2001a), ‘Civilization
and its Discontents’ (2001c) and, in a parallel concern with the inauguration
of language in the subject in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (2001b) Freud
discusses the concerns of his patients, and indeed of ‘civilisation’ more
broadly, with the possibilities of operating with a desire that is sometimes
free of beating, guilt, or aggression.
11 The connection between human rights and the free market has been well
made by Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak in her revision of ‘Can the subaltern
speak?’ (1999). She has also addressed the dominating Christian
metaphysics of human rights (2003).
12 This insert is referenced from Wendy Brown’s discussion of sovereignty
(2007).
13 Lacan states: ‘It is in the name of the father that we must recognize the
basis of the symbolic function which, since the dawn of historical time,
has identified this person with the figure of law’ (Lacan: 2006: 230).
14 This configuration appears throughout Lacan’s work but can best be
understood as the relation between need/demand/desire, where ‘need’ stands
in for an amalgam of the drives. ‘Desire’ is what emerges in the remainder
where ‘demand’ (as the symbolic of language) does not align with the
‘needs’ of the subject (as the imaginary) (Lacan 2006: 579-80).
15 Lacan’s discussion of this relation is best articulated in his seminar on
ethics (Lacan 1992).
16 A qualifier is required here because the ‘imaginary’, for Lacan is that to
which language refers, or more accurately, to what the repressed from this
scene refers. Language, in this sense straddles the symbolic order and the
imaginary. See Lacan’s elaboration of ‘Schema L’ and subsequent discussion
(Lacan 2006: 40). See also Dylan Evans’ discussion of ‘Language’ (Evans
1996).
17 This is particularly taken up by Agamben, Homo Sacer and the
accompanying Agambenites. See Mathew Sharpe’s discussion of the
problematics of a fascination with Agamben (2006).
18 Mussawir’s phrase, a description of Foucault’s concept of power is readily




19 As Derrida offers, law is always an authorised force, and it is authorised
through an originary violence that secures the authority of its sovereignty.
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